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Having unjustifiably and inexcusably wronged another person and blaming ourselves for it, we 
characteristically feel guilt. We feel bad in a way prompting us to accept the justified anger and 
judgment of the victim and to set things right: to apologize, mitigate harm, mend the 
relationship. Moreover, trying to set things right strikes us as the only unproblematic way to 
alleviate the pain—unless the suffering is disproportional to the seriousness of what we have 
done, and needs to be turned down a notch. When proportional, the feeling of guilt is, we sense, 
deserved. Mirroring all this is the characteristic angry blame directed at us from the victims or 
those reacting on their behalf, implicitly or explicitly calling on us to engage in self-blame. When 
one is guilty, this too seems deserved; when innocent, undeserved. 
 Reflecting on these phenomena, it is tempting to think that  
 
BLAME AND DESERVED GUILT: Blaming someone for something presupposes or involves 
the sense that they deserve to feel guilty about it.1  
 
Moreover, our sense that guilt is deserved seems independent of any thought that it would have 
good consequences. Guilt, we feel, is deserved merely in virtue of what we have done.2 
 Relatedly, it is tempting to think that being blameworthy involves or implies deserving blame, 
that one deserves blame only to the extent that one deserves self-blame, that self-blame is guilt, 
and that blaming oneself more involves feeling more guilt. From these assumptions, it follows 
that 
 
BLAMEWORTHINESS AND DESERVED GUILT: One is blameworthy for something only if one 
deserves to feel guilty about it.3 One is worthy of more blame only if one deserves to feel 
more guilt. 
 
More strongly, one might think that deservedness of guilt, or guiltworthiness, constitutes the 
explanatory core of blameworthiness.4 First, an influential Strawsonian tradition understands 
other-blame as resentment or indignation,5 and it is natural to see such reactive attitudes as 
aiming exactly at the target’s pained recognition of what they have done.6 Given this, other-
blame seems to presuppose exactly what feeling guilt does: that the target deserves to feel guilt. 
                                               
1 For the latter, stronger, idea, see Portmore’s (forthcoming) suggestion that blame involves its seeming to the 
blamer that the target “deserves to suffer the unpleasantness of guilt, regret, or remorse”.  
2 In the terminology of Pereboom (2001; 2014), the desert thus seems to be “basic”.  
3 See e.g. Clarke 2016 about moral blameworthiness. Duggan 2018 defends the closely related thesis that one 
is morally responsible “in a liability sense for a transgression” only if one deserves to feel guilt. 
4 Carlsson (2017; 2019) defends this though for “accountability blame”, which involves reactive attitudes like 
resentment, indignation and guilt, but not for what he calls “attributability blame”. 
5 See e.g. Wallace 1994; Wolf 2011, inspired by Strawson 1962. 
6 See, among many others, Darwall 2006, ch. 4; Macnamara 2015; Rosen 2015; Shoemaker 2015, ch. 3; 
Fricker 2016. 
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Second, one might think that it is the implication of deserved guilt that best explains the 
common idea that blame is a sanction that one can deserve more or less of, that degrees of 
blameworthiness are a matter of the severity of the deserved sanction, and that one can therefore 
only be to blame for things over which one had a high degree of control. This idea might seem 
to fit badly with an understanding of blameworthiness in terms of other-blame, as the severity 
of the sanctions imposed by indignation seems highly contingent on the blamed agent’s 
dependence on the blamer’s good will and the circumstances in which the indignation is 
expressed. By contrast, feeling guilt seems to be a form of suffering and so bad for one, and 
feeling more guilt worse.7 
 These connections between blame, blameworthiness, and guilt are natural and have 
considerable explanatory potential. But as I will argue, they are fundamentally mistaken. Trying 
to account for a wider range of cases, we can see that blame does not presuppose that the target 
deserves to feel guilt and does not essentially aim at the target’s suffering in recognition of what 
they have done, even when taking the form of resentment or indignation. And the blameworthy 
do not necessarily deserve to be blamed, and even when they do, they do not necessarily deserve 
to suffer. 
 On the constructive side, I will offer a new explanation of why, in typical cases of moral 
blameworthiness, the agent deserves blame, and in particular the pained recognition of guilt. 
The explanation will lean on (i) a general account of moral and non-moral blame and 
blameworthiness and (ii) a version of the popular idea that moral blame in particular targets 
agents’ objectionable quality of will. 
 
1. Non-moral self-blame without guilt or desert 
Though most who accept BLAME AND DESERVED GUILT or BLAMEWORTHINESS AND DESERVED 
GUILT have had moral blame in mind, our focus will first be on cases of non-moral self-blame. 
The reason for this is two-fold. First, such cases show how some of the aspects that are also 
central to moral blame bring neither the suffering of paradigmatic feelings of guilt, nor any 
sense that suffering is deserved. Second, they illustrate the structure that moral and non-moral 
blame have in common, a structure that will be central to understanding what is special about 
moral blame and why paradigmatic cases of moral self-blame do involve something that is 
properly called suffering and is well understood as deserved. 
 For an example of the relevant sort of non-moral self-blame, contrast three cases where I 
form a false belief. Suppose first that I form it based on evidence that would mislead anyone. 
Later learning that the belief is false, I judge that it was in this way epistemically bad, but I don’t 
blame myself for it: that I formed this false belief was merely a matter of bad epistemic luck. 
Suppose next that I form the belief based on evidence that would mislead nearly everyone, but 
not those with truly exemplary epistemic habits. Learning that it is false, I also learn that the 
                                               
7 See Carlsson 2017; 2019. I reject the claim that the control condition of blameworthiness is explained by 
the sanctioning involved in blame because (i) non-moral blameworthiness can require at least as much control 
as moral blameworthiness without involving suffering and (ii) the control requirement seems well explained 
from the assumption that moral blame is grounded in demands that agents care about moral values. (Some 
of this will be clearer later on; also see Björnsson and Persson 2012; Björnsson 2017a.)  
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evidence I relied upon had an esoteric statistical property revealing it as unreliable. With my 
formation of a false belief serving as a concrete lesson, I update my epistemic strategies 
accordingly, refining my doxastic heuristics. But I don’t blame myself for the failure; though I 
hold myself to high epistemic standards, they don’t require knowing about and keeping track of 
esoteric statistics that I haven’t come upon before. Suppose, finally, that I form the belief based 
on someone else’s authority, failing to check who they were and what their evidence was because 
the belief pleasingly seemed to support a hypothesis I hoped to be true. Upon discovering the 
falsehood of the belief and realizing why I had formed it, I not only see the episode as a lesson 
for future belief formation, but blame myself for having formed a false belief because of a 
substandard responsiveness to the evidence.  
 My self-blame here is not merely causal self-blame or some weak form of agent regret: in 
all three cases, my agency was involved in the regrettable formation of the false belief, but only 
the third occasioned self-blame. Nor is the self-blame merely a matter of pinning the belief on 
a failure to respond to available reasons, as my belief in the second case was due to my failure 
to take into account a statistical property of the available evidence. It is crucial that I fell short 
of standards that I hold myself to and take to have applied to me at the time. This is why the 
epistemically bad formation of a bad belief highlights something (perhaps mildly) alarming 
about me. And it is why self-blame of this sort characteristically involves an emotional reaction 
that not only has the bad action or outcome as its object, but also targets oneself, and is naturally 
expressed in a self-directed reprimand.8 
 To substantiate these claims, I will say more below about the nature of self-blame and 
blame generally. But pending further detail, we can recognize the difference between my 
reactions in the three cases. We can also recognize that the third case will characteristically 
involve a negatively valenced emotional response to the badness of the belief, my gullibility, and 
the involvement of my gullibility in the belief formation, likely in the form of irritation or anger 
directed at myself. This response is naturally understood as self-blame, and seems fitting in light 
of what I have done. Still, it does not seem to constitute even very mild suffering of the sort 
characteristic of guilt, such that it is prima facie non-instrumentally bad for me to be in it.9 It 
also does not seem to constitute a sanction, or a state that I deserve to be in. And it does not seem 
to presuppose or involve the sense that I deserve to suffer. Because of all this, it doesn’t much 
resemble paradigmatic cases of moral guilt. 
 Take these points in turn, starting with the claim that the negatively valenced state of self-
blame doesn’t constitute suffering or make me prima facie non-instrumentally worse off. 
                                               
8 My self-blame thus goes beyond mere criticism, understood as attempts to get the agent to understand the 
reasons not to do what they did, why it was the wrong thing to do, and to change behavior (Jeppsson 2016). 
It also goes beyond negative evaluative and emotional responses to attributability, i.e. to bad aspects of agency 
that do not necessarily violate standards that the agent is held to (see e.g. Watson 1996; Arpaly and Schroeder 
2014; Shoemaker 2015), and more characteristically involves self-directed anger or irritation than shame, 
and so isn’t mere “attributability blame” in the sense of Carlsson 2019. But as I will stress, it also lacks the 
connection to sanctions and harsh treatment standardly associated with accountability blame. 
9 I say prima facie non-instrumentally bad. One might think that some suffering is overall non-instrumentally 
good for someone because it is deserved, but that it is deserved exactly because it is prima facie non-
instrumentally bad for them. 
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Admittedly, realizing that some substandard aspect of oneself has resulted in a bad outcome 
might be deeply painful, especially when the aspect is resistant to change or central to one’s self-
conception. But it doesn’t have to be that way, and most often isn’t. Noticing and being 
momentarily alarmed by my gullibly acquired misbelief, I commit to be more alert to the quality 
of certain kinds of evidence, and then move on. While my life might have been made marginally 
worse by my gullibility and my misbelief, it was not made prima facie non-instrumentally worse 
by fleetingly being in the negatively valenced state of self-blame. Perhaps the state disrupted 
other activities, and perhaps dramatically so. Indeed, it might be part of the function of this sort 
of state to disrupt other ongoing activities by calling on me to immediately notice the role my 
gullibility played in the formation of a false belief and to commit to be less gullible. But suppose 
that any negative disruptive consequences were insignificant enough to be compensated for by 
my decreased gullibility. Then I wouldn’t have traded anything of value to not be in that state. 
 One might perhaps think that negatively valenced phenomenal states are necessarily prima 
facie bad for one. But that’s a mistake. What gives phenomenal states their negative valence is 
not that they are themselves bad, but that they present something as bad: in this case the false 
belief, my gullibility, and the role of my gullibility in forming the belief. Moreover, such states 
do not plausibly constitute even mild suffering as long as one is at peace with them; as long as one 
does not occurrently desire not to be in them. Consider sorrow as an example.10 While sorrow 
is negatively valenced and can constitute suffering, sorrow with which one has found peace does 
not. Likewise for regret, disappointment, frustration, and even pain. While the moments of 
regret, disappointment, and frustration involved in practicing a skill might constitute suffering, 
they typically do not, and the same goes for the pains of physical exercise and sports massage.11 
 Because being in a negatively valenced state of self-blame doesn’t itself constitute a cost to 
me, it is also not well understood as a sanction. One might naturally think that it is: It is the 
response to violated expectations, like legal sanctions, and arguably has as its psychological 
function to bring me to satisfy a certain standard, analogously to how legal sanctions (on some 
understandings) have as their function to promote abidance by imposing costs on transgressions. 
But unlike legal sanctions (so understood), it isn’t that the state is bad for me that prompts me 
to be less gullible, to avoid being in that state. Rather, the state is one of being alerted to how 
the bad gullibility yielded a bad belief, and of being alarmed by this. Compare Christine 
Korsgaard’s claim that “Pain is not the condition that is a reason to change your condition…. 
It is your perception that you have a reason to change your condition.”12 Setting aside 
Korsgaard’s claim about pain specifically, I similarly say that my negatively valenced feeling of 
self-blame is my vivid sense that forming the belief was bad, that being gullible in that way is 
                                               
10 Duggan 2018 interestingly understands guilt as sorrow over what one has done, a kind of sorrow deserved 
by those “morally responsible in a liability sense for a transgression.” 
11 For axiological purposes, one might want to understand pain as an occurrent experiential state that one 
occurrently prefers not to be in for its own sake. Given that notion, pain might perhaps always be prima facie 
non-instrumentally bad for one, but then some states that are naturally described as painful fail to be pains. 
12 See Korsgaard 1996: 148.  
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unacceptable, and that my gullibility was instrumentally bad in virtue of its role in the formation 
of the belief. The role of the state is to alert me to reasons to improve, not to be such a reason.13 
 Being in this state of self-blame is also not something I deserve. It might be natural to mistake 
it for such a state: it is a negatively valenced phenomenal state, and one that seems fitting in 
light of my gullible belief formation. But that’s too quick. As I have just argued, the state isn’t 
bad for me, and it seems that in order for me to deserve something, it has to be bad for me in 
some sense, not good or neutral. For example, suppose that I recklessly break something of 
yours. Then I might incur obligations to let you know and to do my best to mend the thing and 
our relationship, and it is natural to think that I deserve the hardships involved. But if I am 
eager to let you know what I have done to get on with the mending, and doing so is a relief 
rather than a burden, it is odd to say that I deserve letting you know.14  
 Moreover, even if my negatively valenced state of self-blame were bad and so could in 
principle be deserved, it wouldn’t actually be deserved, even on the plausible assumption that it 
is in some intuitive sense fitting. Here are two ways of seeing this: First, if the state had been 
deserved in the way that feeling guilt is deserved in central cases of moral blameworthiness, it 
would be prima facie wrong or bad to decrease its intensity and duration. But it isn’t: if I could 
diminish the state to a mere flicker through meditation, without undermining the lessons 
learned from the occasion, the diminishing of the state would not be a consideration against 
meditating. Second, for being in the state to be deserved in the relevant sense, it would have to 
be good as a matter of justice, because of what makes me blameworthy.15 Now, being pained by 
my gullible misbelief might perhaps be seen as good in virtue of being an integral part of my 
caring about truth and knowledge, or an integral part of caring about living up to the standard 
I violated, analogous to how the pain of grief might be seen as good in virtue of being an integral 
part of caring about what has been lost.16 And perhaps painful disappointment or self-scorn 
might seem “deserved” in the sense that it would correctly reflect that I fell short of standards I 
hold myself to. But it is hard to see how the degree to which I feel bad about my gullible misbelief 
is a matter of justice.17 
 Neither my self-blame nor my sense that I am to blame for my gullible misbelief seems to 
come with the sense that I deserve to be pained by the recognition of what I have done. Nor 
does my self-blame seem to presuppose that I deserve this. As I have argued, the negatively 
valenced feeling involved is not itself prima facie non-instrumentally bad, and there is no sign 
that it aims or involves any disposition to impose suffering. While self-directed anger might be 
involved in this sort of self-blame—one might “feel like kicking oneself”—that anger craves no 
suffering in response, only that one starts taking the standard with sufficient seriousness.18  
                                               
13 Compare Bok 1998: 167–70.  
14 See Nelkin 2013: 121; 2016: 177; Macnamara 2020. 
15 See Macnamara 2015; Clarke 2016. 
16 See McKenna 2019; though see Nelkin 2019 for criticism. 
17 Compare Macnamara 2020 about attempts to establish claims like BLAMEWORTHINESS AND DESERVED 
GUILT on the basis of claims about goodness or fittingness. 
18 Portmore (forthcoming) points to psychological experiments confirming the presence of desert-related 
characteristics in central cases of moral blame, self-blame, and guilt. He further takes these experiments to 
suggest that the desert element is present also in non-moral blame, based on data indicating strong similarities 
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 Finally, and for all the above reasons, it should be clear that the sort of self-blame at work 
in many non-moral cases doesn’t constitute guilt. I might be annoyed that I formed the belief 
and might give myself an angry reprimand before moving on. But the negatively valenced state 
I’m in lacks characteristic elements of guilt: the state isn’t prima facie non-instrumentally bad 
for me, isn’t plausibly or intuitively understood as deserved, and involves no sense that I deserve 
to suffer or that there is anything that has to be set right, apart from the sense that my way of 
responding to evidence won’t do. 
 Admittedly, some of what I have said about my self-blame might be intelligibly resisted. 
For suppose that the operative epistemic standards are moral standards, perhaps grounded in 
the fact that substandard belief formation might harm others or constitute a kind of morally 
objectionable disrespect of reason or truth. Then it might seem less implausible that I deserve 
to feel bad about my gullible belief formation. (In section 4, we return to how the nature of the 
standards involved matters for desert.) All I need here, though, is the idea that some clear cases 
of non-moral self-blame differ in relevant regards from paradigmatic moral self-blame. Thus 
consider my case of epistemic self-blame on the assumption that while I violated standards that 
I justifiably hold myself to, satisfying these standards or holding myself to them is not morally 
required. Or consider the self-blame of Judy, a formidable juggler. Instead of forming a false 
belief like me, she miscalculates a throw and loses the rhythm necessary to complete an 
advanced sequence involving a chainsaw and two torches. Like my gullible belief formation, 
her sequence was botched because her skill-relevant responsiveness to the situation fell below 
the exacting standard that she justifiably holds herself to. And like me, she blames herself for 
the resulting failure, annoyed, before giving the sequence another try and succeeding. What I 
said about my self-blame goes equally for hers: though her response was substandard, botching 
the sequence bad, and her state of self-blame fitting, her fleeting negatively valenced state of 
self-blame didn’t make her situation prima facie worse, isn’t plausibly seen as a sanction, isn’t 
plausibly something that she deserved in the way guilt seems deserved in paradigmatic cases of 
moral blameworthiness, and doesn’t involve or presuppose the sense that she deserves to suffer. 
 In light of all this, it seems clear that BLAME AND DESERVED GUILT is mistaken if understood 
without restriction, as concerned with blame generally. Likewise, BLAMEWORTHINESS AND 
DESERVED GUILT is mistaken if understood as concerned with blameworthiness generally. For 
it seems clear that I am to blame for my gullible belief-formation and Judy to blame for her 
botched sequence, and that we are thus in some sense correct in blaming ourselves for these 
things and so blameworthy for them (in senses of “correct” and “blameworthy” that I’ll return 
to in section 3).  
 
2. Moral blameworthiness without deserved suffering 
Though reflection on non-moral blame and blameworthiness unrestricted versions of BLAME 
AND DESERVED GUILT and BLAMEWORTHINESS AND DESERVED GUILT, most who have been 
tempted by claims like these have had restricted kinds of blame and blameworthiness in mind. 
                                               
between guilt and regret of self-inflicted harm (Zeelenberg and Breugelmans 2008). As far as I can tell, 
however, the similarities in question do not involve what is essential to the relevant sense of desert.  
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For some, it has been moral blame and moral blameworthiness. For others, it has been blame that 
involves holding someone accountable and a corresponding relation of accountability, i.e. the relation 
in virtue of which one is liable to be held accountable for something.19 Eventually, I will argue 
that even restricted in these ways, the two capitalized claims fail. But pending that argument, 
the fact that they have to be restricted raises questions: 
 
1. What is it about moral or accountability blameworthiness specifically that makes blame 
deserved? 
 
2. Why is it that guilt specifically is deserved in cases of accountability or moral 
blameworthiness? 
 
The answer to the first question will be based on an assumption about the standards violated by 
the morally blameworthy. I understand these as interpersonally valid demands to give people's 
perspectives and interest and other moral values a certain weight in deliberation and action, or 
to accord them a certain de facto “standing”. In violating such standards, one has accorded 
some value too low a standing compared to one’s own perspective or interests. One thus incurs 
obligations to restore its relative standing, by subordinating one's own perspective or interests 
to it, and becomes liable to be subordinated by others. 
 The answer to the second question is that paradigmatic cases of moral blame involve the 
sense that subordination is required, and specifically a kind of subordination that involves 
staying with the pained recognition of one’s fault. 
 These answers vindicate the intuitions supporting the capitalized claims. But they also leave 
open the possibility that one might be morally blameworthy without deserving pain specifically, 
as well as the possibility of moral blame that works more like non-moral blame. Before spelling 
out the relevant account of blame and blameworthiness generally and the specifics of moral 
blame and blameworthiness, consider for illustration: 
 
Jiro: Because his writing has been unusually engaging, Jiro has knowingly ignored a 
promise to go visit his friend Joan, who is going through a crisis. When he sees that Joan 
is calling, presumably to hear what is going on, Jiro immediately regrets his priorities. 
Clearly, it was his insufficient concern for Joan and his exaggerated focus on writing that 
left Joan hanging at a difficult time. As Jiro has done similar things before, to others, and 
have become increasingly dissatisfied with this tendency, this realization prompts an 
immediate value conversion. As a result, he sincerely apologizes to Joan and sets out to 
make his way there as quickly as possible to make things right. Throughout, he feels a 
number of emotions. First regret and horror at what he had done and concern for Joan, 
before the value conversion prompts empathy-driven somber determination to do right 
by Joan, initially accompanied by relief that he had cast off his mistaken values. 
 
On natural ways of filling in this scenario, it seems that (1) Jiro is morally to blame for not visiting 
Joan prior to the phone call. (2) Jiro deserves blame for what he has done. (3) There is nothing 
                                               
19 Carlsson 2017 and Duggan 2018 defend the implication from accountability (or “liability” in Duggan’s 
terminology) to deserved guilt. For the classic piece on the distinction between accountability and neighboring 
relations between an agent and a possible object of blame, see Watson 1996. Also see n. 8. 
 BLAME, DESERVED GUILT, AND HARMS TO STANDING 
Forthcoming in Self-Blame and Moral Responsibility, ed. A. Brekke Carlsson gbjorn@su.se 
8(16) 
that he deserved to feel or do in virtue of what he had done that he didn’t feel or do. But 
(4) neither the explicit details of the story nor what needs to be filled in implies any suffering on 
Jiro’s part. It is true that in attending to the fact that he harmed Joan and made his own life 
prima facie non-instrumentally worse, he reacted with horror and regret. As noted, though, we 
shouldn’t think that being in negatively valenced phenomenal states, including moments of 
regret or horror, is itself necessarily prima facie non-instrumentally bad for one. And because 
of Jiro’s immediate value conversion, he found himself at peace with the fact that his old values 
and actions were unacceptable and that he would have to make up for what he had done. 
 Like our cases of non-moral blame, the case of Jiro suggests that blame and 
blameworthiness do not presuppose or imply that the target deserves to suffer. Some who have 
considered cases where the guilty party changes values and does their best to set things right but 
without suffering the pains of guilt have drawn the opposite conclusion. But they might have 
imagined the agent, not as Jiro, but as a “wrongdoer who responds to outward blame with a 
sincere and cheerful promise to do better next time but without a hint of guilt or remorse”.20 
Considering such a character, it is natural to think that he “palpably frustrates a desire implicit 
in resentment’’21 or in any case that he doesn’t get what he deserves. But cheerfulness isn’t the 
only alternative to suffering. When we empathically hear someone out who has been harmed, 
or engage in hard and serious conversation, or humbly consider our faults, or do all these things 
intermixed, we are not cheerful, and our phenomenal states might be negatively valenced. But 
we also do not necessarily suffer, or find ourselves in states that are prima facie non-
instrumentally bad for us. Jiro doesn’t, and still his emotional response seems perfectly adequate 
to his blameworthiness.  
 In what follows, I will outline an account of blame and blameworthiness generally and an 
account of what makes moral instances of these special. These accounts, I will argue, can explain 
why the suffering of guilt is deserved in typical cases of moral blameworthiness but not in cases 
of non-moral blameworthiness, and not in cases like Jiro’s. 
 
3. Blame and blameworthiness 
Blame, whether moral or non-moral, has both a target and an object: someone is blamed for something. 
To account for blame, we thus need to understand how it relates to both target and object, what 
it presupposes about their relation, and what sort of a response it is to these matters.22 
 At a natural level of description, the targets are uniform: agents with relevant capacities.23 
However, objects of blame vary immensely in salient ways, even restricting attention to moral 
                                               
20 See Rosen 2015: 82–83. 
21 Ibid. 83. 
22 The account here draws on accounts of blameworthiness and blame developed in Björnsson 2017a; 2020a; 
ms. For reasons of space, I cannot here motivate my preference of this account over its main competitors, but 
many of these have been designed primarily to handle cases of moral blame, and go wrong or stay silent 
about cases of non-moral blame that target failures of skill rather than failures of will and involve neither 
reactive attitudes, relationship modification, protests, or holding the object of blame against the target of 
blame. 
23 Blame can target both individual agents and groups of agents (see Björnsson 2020b); focus here will be on 
the former. 
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blame. We readily blame people for attitudes, decisions, intentional actions and omissions, acts 
and failures of noticing or remembering something important, along with various outcomes of 
all these things. As we look at other domains, it seems again that a wide variety of responses or 
failure to respond to aspects of the circumstances matter, as well as a variety of outcomes of 
such failures: failure to notice or appreciate an opening in a game of chess, to adequately 
balance force and direction of the foot hitting the soccer ball, or to balance colors or proportions 
for a painting, resulting in an avoidable loss, a failed pass, and forgettable art. One thing that 
objects of blame have in common, though, is that they are understood as bad within the relevant 
domain, as something to be avoided. Another commonality is that they are due to a substandard 
responsiveness to aspects of the circumstances: a responsiveness that falls short of the blamer’s 
demands or normative expectations on the agent. 
 Our concern with this complex of conditions, I have argued, is primarily due to our 
concern with outcomes in domains or skill. A skill, in the relevant sense, is an ability to respond to 
circumstances so as to promote certain values. Specifically, it is a way of responding to 
circumstances that has been improved in response to successful or failed promotion of those values, 
an improvement that has been possible because the degree of promotion is systematically 
affected by how one responds to circumstances. Thus, acquiring knowledge or forming true, 
justified, or excellent belief are skills aimed at promoting epistemic values, as are abilities to 
notice, seek, and weigh evidence. Juggling is a skill aiming at excellent juggling, as are its 
component abilities, including various abilities to throw, catch, and track projectiles. Caring 
about what is morally important or valuable is also a skill, aimed at promoting the objects of 
caring, as are various aspects of caring well so as to better promote these objects, including 
dispositions to notice and be motivated by opportunities for promotion.  
 Blaming requires three interrelated abilities to identify certain kinds of conditions and 
responding to these so as to build and uphold certain levels of skill: 
 First, the ability to identify the value of relevant outcomes, required for learning what 
outcomes to promote or prevent. 
 Second, the ability to identify cases where good or bad outcomes are due to the 
responsiveness of agents so that the responsiveness can be evaluated as instrumentally good or 
bad and reinforced or adjusted accordingly. This involves distinguishing when modes of 
responsiveness explain outcomes in line with a systematic tendency to do so (in “normal” ways) 
and when they “just happen” to have these outcomes. 
 Finally, since we often rely on certain levels of skill, the ability to identify and react to 
instances falling below such levels so as to promote correction. Differently put: the ability to 
demand or normatively expect a certain skill level, in weak senses of “demand” and “normative 
expect”, or to hold the agent to a certain standard of skill. 
 When I say that we have abilities to do these things, I mean that we have mechanisms the 
function of which is to make it the case that we do these things, in the sense that these 
mechanisms continue to play the role they do in our psychology because they have done this.24 
                                               
24 For the sort of account of etiological function that I have in mind, see Millikan 1984. 
 BLAME, DESERVED GUILT, AND HARMS TO STANDING 
Forthcoming in Self-Blame and Moral Responsibility, ed. A. Brekke Carlsson gbjorn@su.se 
10(16) 
 The mechanisms in virtue of which we have and exercise these abilities operate prior to 
intentional guidance, and without the involvement of reflective understanding of what exactly 
the values or demands are or what makes the explanatory connections relevantly normal. In a 
non-factive and metaphorical sense, we just see these things. Specifically, in jointly exercising 
these abilities we can come to see something as someone’s “fault”:  
 
FAULT:  For Y to be X’s fault is for Y to be bad and explained in a normal way by X’s 
responsiveness falling short of applicable standards. 
 
Seeing something as someone’s fault, I claim, is the core component of blaming someone for 
something. Judy immediately saw that the botched sequence was her fault, and Jiro immediately 
saw that having left Joan waiting was his fault. 
 Given the functions of the three abilities involved, seeing something as someone’s fault 
plausibly has a more specific function:  
 
FAULT FUNCTION: The specific general function of seeing Y as X’s fault is to prompt 
satisfaction of the relevant standard of responsiveness. The normal way for this to happen 
is (i) for the “demand” mechanisms to direct negative attention to X’s substandard 
responsiveness, (ii) for the mechanisms for feedback learning to direct negative attention 
to the role of that responsiveness in bringing about Y, and (iii) for the negative attention 
to these features to prompt improvement of the responsiveness.  
 
The performance of this function is most straightforward in the case of self-blame, which is our 
main focus here. But we can be alarmed when the substandard responsiveness of another agent 
has bad outcomes, taking their case as a lesson for ourselves, or convey the lesson to them as 
well as to third parties.  
 We can now spell out a general account of blame: 
  
BLAME: To blame X for Y is for one to see Y as X’s fault and for the mechanisms normally 
performing the function of this state to be operative.25 
  
On this account, if one thinks that something was someone’s fault without that thought 
prompting activity in the demand and learning mechanisms, one isn’t blaming (other than in a 
dispositional sense). Still, the mechanisms can be operative without successfully performing their 
full function. 
 I have said that blame is guided by our sense that something is someone’s fault. Our 
intuitive sense that blame is fitting or correct in some cases but not others primarily tracks the 
very same condition.26 Of course, this sense of fittingness might be guided by unjustifiable values 
or demands. But idealizing these away, we can say that: 
                                               
25 The quasi-perceptual state of seeing A as F is distinct from the explicit personal-level judgment that A is F. 
Indeed, I might accept that something isn’t my fault but nevertheless, at some level, see it as my fault and so, 
at that level, blame myself for it. 
 The account concerns the psychological activity of blaming. There is also blaming as a communicative 
act or a speech act, as when someone says that Y was X’s fault. Here my focus will be primarily on the former.  
26 Given FAULT FUNCTION, this is also arguably what blaming someone represents, in the sort of naturalistic 
sense of “represent” developed by Ruth Millikan, beginning with her (1984). That the activity of blaming is 
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BLAMEWORTHINESS: X is to blame for Y, X is blameworthy for Y, and blaming X for Y is 
fitting or correct, if, and only if, Y is bad relative to a justifiable value and explained in a 
normal way by X’s responsiveness falling short of applicable justifiable standards. 
 
The account sketched in this section makes sense of blame’s complex structure. Blame has 
an object and a target because it involves both a negative evaluation of the object and normative 
expectations directed at the agent whose substandard responsiveness explains the object. It also 
makes sense of blame’s pervasiveness, because it relies only on abilities and responses that are 
central to domains of skill. And it explains why blame is embedded in or accompanied by a 
wide variety of emotional reactions: disappointment or horror in light of the object of blame, 
regret of one’s involvement in bad outcomes, often overshadowed by arousal in the form of 
irritation and anger aimed at dealing with the problem, and sometimes shame, disgust, and 
disdain, as agential failures are implicated. As we will see in the next section, the account can 
also help us understand what is distinctive about central cases of moral blame.  
 
4. Moral blame, deserved guilt, and harms to standing  
Equipped with accounts of blame and blameworthiness, let us return to our questions from 
Section 2: Why do the morally blameworthy characteristically deserve certain negative 
consequences, and why do they often deserve to feel guilt, or to be pained by the recognition of 
their blameworthiness? The answer, I believe, is complex. It involves the nature of the 
normative expectations that ground moral blame, the nature of the objects of blame, and the 
relation between these. Seeing its complexity lets us understand both why the pain of guilt often 
seems deserved, and why it sometimes does not.  
 Start with four aspects of the demands at work in the moral domain: First, these demands 
concern agents’ quality of will: they are demands that agents care about various values enough 
in relation to other values. Second, these demands are categorical: they are demands that agents 
care about such things whether they want to or not. Contrast these with some non-moral 
demands, such as the juggler’s demands on her juggling skills, which she might understand as 
contingent on her own preferences. Third, these demands are at least typically interpersonal: 
others justifiably have normative expectations that agents live up to these demands. 
Correspondingly, violations of the demands that ground moral blame tend to be violations of 
demands that not only the agent but others can justifiably make on the agent. Fourth, these 
demands tend to be requirements of acceptable cooperation. The categorical interpersonal demands 
are thus backed up by potential threats of partial or full alienation. If others see one as falling 
short, they will often be fully cooperative only after one has displayed commitment to the 
relevant standards.27 
 These first four features of moral demands partially explain the suffering of the morally 
guilty. The demands inherent in moral blame are demands that one changes what one cares 
                                               
fitting or correctly represents the world doesn’t mean that it is all things considered wise or morally 
appropriate; it might have bad consequences, or the blamer lack standing to blame (see D'Arms and Jacobson 
2000). 
27 For an influential discussion, see Bennett 2002. 
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about. Doing so involves abandoning some things that one cares about, at least to some degree, 
by downgrading their relative importance. Prior to a completed change, this will be understood 
as pro tanto bad and will tend to be subject to partial inner resistance. When one is morally 
blameworthy, accepting these demands will thus tend to hurt.28 Add to this that one might have 
been seen by others as failing expectations, and that one’s valuable relationships might be 
threatened, and the pain of abandoning some things one values might be accompanied by social 
fear. Moreover, the process of coming to accept self-blame often involves coming to see clearly, 
with engaged empathy, not only how others might see one, but how they have been harmed. 
In such cases, the empathic mirroring of their pain and the regret involved in seeing what one 
has brought about can further contribute to suffering.29 
 All this also points to important reasons why moral self-blame triggers attempts to mend 
relationships and show others that one is committed to the norms one has violated.30 And it 
explains why we might have not only reasons but obligations to engage in the processes that 
bring the suffering. For the following principles seem plausible: 
 
OBLIGATION FROM HARM: If some undeserved harm (material, psychological, social…) 
happened because of X, X acquires a pro tanto obligation to help set things right. 
 
OBLIGATION FROM POSITION: If X is in a unique position to help alleviate some harm, X 
has a pro tanto obligation to do so. 
 
Given these, if I am morally to blame for harming a relationship, I typically acquire a pro tanto 
obligation to help mend it: the harm was due to me, and I am uniquely placed to set things 
right. And setting things right will mean accepting the demands of moral blame, and so endure 
the suffering involved.  
 Still, what has been said thus far leaves unexplained the sense that the suffering 
characteristically involved in feeling guilty would be deserved. That sense, we have said, involves 
the idea that it is good as a matter of justice, in light of what makes the agent blameworthy, that 
the agent is subjected to it. But neither of the two principles above tracks whether the harm was 
due to the agent’s substandard caring, or was the agent’s moral fault: they would yield analogous 
obligations when someone harms a relationship because of a non-culpable confusion. 
 Instead, I will suggest, what explains the implication of desert is that morally blameworthy 
action brings a moral imbalance in the standing moral values, and in particular the standing of 
moral agents. While I lack space to give the idea a full defense or articulation, my hope is that 
the following sketch will make it plausible enough to merit further consideration. 
 As understood here, the standing of something is a matter of the weight given to it in 
deliberation and action. The standing of some value might be most visible when we feel that it 
is compromised, as when someone’s authority or interests or some project one cares about is 
ignored or downplayed: perhaps someone’s views are not taken seriously in seminars, their 
                                               
28 Compare Bennett’s (2002) suggestion that guilt is self-alienation. 
29 See Shoemaker 2015: 110–11. Emotional responses to the anger of actual victims or representatives of 
victims might play a role in developing guilt as response to one’s own perception that one has done wrong.  
30 For some important aspects of this, see Bennett 2002. 
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preferences ignored when making plans for a night out, or perhaps the University cuts teaching 
and research funding while administration grows. 
 Crucially, moral blameworthiness is unavoidably tied to standing, so understood. The 
relevant moral demands are demands that we accord various weights, or demands that we care 
about them to certain degrees, as a Strawsonian tradition has it.31 On the understanding I 
prefer, to care about a value in the relevant sense is to be disposed to notice factors promoting 
or thwarting it and to spend psychological, social or material resources to promote it.32 
Correspondingly, caring more about one thing than another involves being disposed to spend 
more resources promoting it. Given this understanding of moral demands, the morally 
blameworthy has always accorded less weight than morality demands to some value – to a 
person’s perspective, well-being, or property, say, or to beauty, truthfulness, or human 
excellence, , say – and this has resulted in something that is bad in relation to that value.33  
 Importantly, when someone’s relative standing is unduly lowered, this is typically not just 
something that was bad at the time. The imbalance in standing is an ongoing harm to that 
person. Perhaps when we last interacted, I gave less weight to your perspective relative to mine 
than morality allows. Then it remains true that I am unacceptably giving your perspective less 
weight than mine until this imbalance has been corrected. Compare: If I took something that 
was rightfully yours, it was not just something bad that happened back then. Your right to that 
thing is given less weight than it should until this has been corrected. 
 What is it to correct an imbalance in standing? Generally speaking, it is to do more to 
promote the value that has been unjustly set aside or thwarted, giving less weight to that which 
has been unjustly favored. Concretely, if your interest in some divisible good has been unduly 
favored over mine, then the most obvious way of correcting the imbalance is for you to favor 
my interest by handing me some of that good. If my perspective has been unduly favored over 
yours in discussion, correcting the imbalance might mean giving your perspective more 
attention and authority while giving mine less. (A morally blameworthy agent has always 
unjustly favored their own perspective; typically, both perspectives and concrete material or 
social interests of victims have been unfairly disregarded.) 
 Because standing is a matter of weight given, correcting many forms of imbalance requires 
the involvement of a particular weight-giver. If I haven’t given enough weight to your interests, 
then others might compensate for that by giving you a helping hand and me the cold shoulder: 
the community at large might then have given our interests the right relative weight. But it 
remains true that I have, overall, inappropriately put my interests before yours. Only I can 
correct for that imbalance. How? Not just by coming to care about your interests to the required 
degree: it will still remain true that I have, overall, unduly put my interests before yours. 
                                               
31 See Strawson 1962; McKenna 2012; Arpaly and Schroeder 2014. Shoemaker (2015) takes the quality of 
will relevant to the sort of blame that concerns us here to be quality of regard for persons; I take persons to 
be (very important) special cases of moral value. 
32 Björnsson 2017a; b 
33 One might be to blame for harms of moral importance even if one cared as much as morality demands, 
being sufficiently disposed to notice and act on moral reasons, because one makes some other kind of mistake. 
But then one isn’t morally to blame for the harm (Björnsson 2017b: 142–44). 
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Correcting the imbalance means putting your interest before mine in action. Similar things can 
be said about other forms of imbalance. If I have unduly failed to give your perspective on things 
the appropriate attention and weight compared to mine, correcting the imbalance does not just 
mean becoming more disposed to take you seriously. It means actually taking you more 
seriously, compared to myself, in thought and action. 
 Based on this, here is why the morally blameworthy deserve setbacks—why such setbacks 
are good as a matter of justice—and why they characteristically deserve the suffering involved 
in feeling guilty: 
 First, as I understand it, the demand to give a certain weight to the perspectives or interests 
of others relative to your own is not just a demand to give such weight on each occasion, but a 
demand to properly balance over time the psychological and material resources invested into 
promoting their perspectives or interests and yours. Moreover, doing so is, in some intuitive 
sense, good as a matter of justice. From this it follows that if I have given your perspective or 
interests less weight relative to mine than required, then morality demands, as a matter of 
justice, that I correct this imbalance.  
 Second, if the guilty have an interest in avoiding the suffering characteristic of guilt, giving 
no weight to that interest is one way in which they can lower their own standing relative to the 
victim. By ignoring this interest in promoting the interests and perspective of the victim, the 
guilty can thus to some extent discharge the demand to rebalance after having put their own 
perspective over that of the victim. 
 This provides the outline of an explanation of why the morally blameworthy deserve to 
have their interests set back, in the sense that it is to some extent good, as a matter of justice. 
Moreover, the set-back of interest is deserved, not because of what further consequences this 
might have, or for contractual reasons. It is deserved exactly because the agent is morally 
blameworthy. 
 We also have an explanation of why, in central cases of moral blameworthiness, it is natural 
to think that the blameworthy deserves the feeling of guilt specifically, or the suffering involved 
in recognizing what they have done. 
 Still, what the guilty deserve on this explanation is not necessarily suffering. It is that their 
standing is lowered relative to the interests and perspectives that they have previously unduly 
subordinated to their own. This is why, when Jiro takes in his wrongdoing, reacts with horror, 
and proceeds with somber empathy-driven determination to right his wrong while setting his 
other interests aside, he doesn’t also deserve to suffer. Correspondingly, while resentment, 
indignation, and guilt sometimes prompt action that rebalances standing by inflicting suffering 
on the blameworthy, rebalancing might also often be achieved by prompting the sort of 
response displayed by Jiro. 
 
5. Loose ends: reactive attitudes, demands on caring 
Running out of space, I have to leave loose ends. 
 In particular, I have said little about the reactive attitudes that figure centrally in many 
accounts of moral blame, blameworthiness, and responsibility. Here I can only indicate in 
slogans what I find plausible given what I have said about blame and blameworthiness: Guilt is 
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the sorrowful sense of having unduly disfavored someone or something34, resentment the angry 
sense of having been unduly disfavored, and indignation the angry sense that someone or 
something has been unduly disfavored. In each case, the object of concern is an imbalance in 
standing, and in each the action tendency is towards rebalancing. Because moral blame n 
particular presupposes that the target has unduly disfavored someone or something, it is 
naturally accompanied by one of these attitudes. And since the morally blameworthy are 
uniquely placed to correct the resulting imbalance, targets of moral blame are also naturally 
targeted by guilt, resentment, or indignation. 
 I have also provided only the barest outline of how demands to give weight to values over 
time ground reasons to rebalance in response to blameworthy action, and said nothing about 
how morality constrains such rebalancing, or about the nature and substance of the demands 
in question. Still, I hope to have made plausible in this paper not only (i) that blame doesn’t in 
general presuppose that the blameworthy deserves to suffer, but also (ii) that the morally 
blameworthy might deserve setbacks exactly because they have given themselves undue weight 
and so harmed the relative standing of others or of other values. If the latter explanation seems 
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